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Undue Influence and Fraud In Wills*
What Constitutes Undue Influence and Fraud, and How
They are Proven

Perhaps the best and most lucid preliminary statement on the subject of Undue Influence to be found in the
books is that of Professor Bigelow on the Law of Wills at
page 81, wherein he states:
"The will must, of course, be the will of the person
who executes the instrument; which means that it must
have been his free or voluntary act. Now one's freedom
of action may be taken away either by coercion or by
what is called undue influence. Of coercion, otherwise
called duress, it is not necessary particularly to speak, for
it is obvious enough that if I sign an instrument under the
orders of' another it is not my own free act. It is my act
in a sense, and my intended act (if the very muscles of my
hand were not compelled by external force applied to
them), for it must have been the result of motives within
my own mind-the stronger motive has prevailed; but that
does not make the act my free act as the law defines Ireedom of action. Legally speaking, the act is not my actthe will is not my will."
In this discussion it is necessary to keep the particular
subj.ect distinct from that of testamentary capacity.
Armor's Estate, 154 Pa. 517.
In outlining the expressions of the Courts on this latter
topic it was pointed out that the requirements of testamentary capacity are not of a very high order. However,
if it is shown that a testator lacks testamentary capacity
obviously it is unnecessary to go into the issue of undue influence. On the other hand if a testator has testamentary
capacity, it may be nevertheless of such a low order as to
make him an easy subject of undue influence.
*Being Chapter V of a projected book, "Wills in Pennsylvania", by
A. J. White Hutton, shortly to be published by Soney and Sage Pub-

lishing Co., Newark, N. J. All rights reserved by the author and

publisher.
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A great deal has been written and many cases, English
and American, have been litigated on the issue of undue influence but it is submitted that out of the mass of learning
upon this topic the remarks of Sir J. P. Wilde, in Hall v.
Hall, L. R. 1 P. & D. 481, from the English Reports, present
the most concise, as well as comprehensive statement extant:
"To make a good will a man must be a free agent. But
all influences are not unlawful. Persuasion, appeals to the
affections or ties of kindred, to a sentiment of gratitude for
past services, or pity for future destitution, or the like,these are all legitimate, and may be fairly pressed on a
testator. On the other hand, pressure of whatever character, whether acting on the fears or the hopes, if so exerted as to overpower the volition without convincing the
judgment, is a species of restraint under which no valid
will can be made. Importunity or threats, such as the
testator has not the courage to resist, moral command
asserted and yielded to for the sake oO peace and quiet, or
of escaping from distress of mind or social discomfort,
these, if carried to a degree in which the free play of the
testator's judgment, discretion or wishes, is overborne,
will constitute undue influence, though no force is either
used or threatened. In a word, a testator may be led but
not driven; and his will must be the offspring of his own
volition, and not the record of some one else's."
Over three quarters of a century ago Woodward, J. in
Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 23 Pa. 375, thus epitomized the
matter:
"When a will duly executed is offered for probate, the
law presumes competency in the testator, and that the instrument expresses his free and unconstrained wishes in regard to the disposition of his property. This presumption
may be rebutted by showing, to the satisfaction of a jury,
that the will was obtained by fraud and imposition practised on the testator, or by duress, or by undue influence.
What constitutes undue influence, is a question which must
depend very much on the circumstances of each case. It is
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in its nature one of those inquiries which cannot be referred
to any general rule. Yet many principles have been settled
by judicial decision which, properly applied, afford in most
cases an adequate guide to a right decision of the question.
Thus one has a right by fair argument and persuasion to induce a testator to make a will in his favor: Miller v. Miller,
3 Ser. & R. 267. And it is not sufficient to set aside a will
to show declarations of the testator that he intended to
make a different one, but that his -wife had a high temper
and interfered: Moritz v. Brough, 16 Ser. & R. 403. If a
wife by her virtues has gained such an ascendancy over
her husband, that her pleasure is the law of his conduct,
such influence is no reason for impeaching a will made in
her favor, even to the exclusion of the residue of her
family; though if that influence was specially exerted to
procure the will in question, it might be sufficient to impeach it: Small v. Small, 4 Greenleaf 220. Threats and flattery, which induce and coerce a testator to subscribe and
execute the will, furnish sufficient ground for setting it
aside: Denslow v. Moore, 2 Day 12. A degree of importunity which deprives a testator of his free agency,
which he is too weak to resist, and which renders the instrument not his free and unconstrained act, will invalidate
a will: Davis v. Calvert, 5 Gill & Johns. 269. But the influence exercised must be such as to destroy free agency.
Unless the jury are satisfied that such mental force has
been exercised as prevented free agency, the influence exerted is not to be considered improper: Browne v. Molliston, 3 Wh. 138. To the same effect is the rule as laid down
in Greenleaf's Ev. vol. 2, Sec. 688, where it is said undue
influence is not that which is obtained by modest persuasion, or by arguments addressed to the understanding, or
by mere appeals to the affections; it must be an influence
obtained either by flattery, excessive importunity or
threats, or in some other mode by which a dominion is
acquired over the will of the testator, destroying his free
agency, and constraining him to do, against his free will,
what he is unable to refuse."
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In the oft cited case, Tawney v. Long, 76 Pa. 106, an
excellent statement is found in the words of Gordon, J.:
"Then we have the declarations of the testator himself, as found in the testimony of Henry Long and his wife;
'that John E. Tawney was dingdonging at him to make his
will, and leave all he had to him and his family'.
"But these declarations prove nothing but such solicitations as do not affect the validity of a will. Even importunate persuasion from which a delicate mind would shrink,
will not invalidate a devise: Miller v. Miller, 3 S. & R. 267.
But beyond this these declarations are too remote from the
time of execution, and are not so connected with other
facts and circumstances indicating circumvention or fraud
in the procurement of the will as to make them part of
the res gestae, and are therefore not evidence: 2 Greenl.
Ev., Part 4, Sec. 690; McTaggart v. Thompson, 2 Harris
149.
We cannot think, therefore, that all this evidence
taken together was sufficient to raise such a question of
undue influence as should have been submitted to the jury.
Undue influence, of that kind which will affect the provisions of a testament, must be such as subjugates the mind
of the testator to the will of the person operating upon it,
and in order to establish this, proof must be made of some
fraud practiced, some threats or misrepresentations made,
some undue flattery, or some physical or moral coercion
employed, so as to destroy the free agency of the testator,
and these influences must be proved to have operated as
a present constraint, at the very time of making the will.
But constraint is not to be inferred from mental weakness alone, though the weak mind may be more readily
constrained and deceived than the strong one; and though
it is to be considered as a fact in determining the question
of constraint, nevertheless, as is said in McMahon v. Ryan,
8 Harris 329, that undue influence, which suffices to destroy
an alleged will, is distinct from weakness and has no
necessary connection with it.
So it has been held that general bad treatment furn-
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ishes no evidence of such influence, and we may add, neither does general kindness, though this may have a powerful
influence upon a weak mind, unless it is shown to be part
of a crafty arrangement to procure the testamentary disposition: Thompson v. Kyner, 15 P. F. Smith, 368; Rudy
v. Ulrich, 19 P. F. Smith 177; Eckert v. Flowry, 7 Wright
46."
In the recent case of Koons's Estate, 293 Pa. 465, Walling, J. states:
"We have examined with care all the evidence and considered all the circumstances in this case and agree with
the Orphans Court that they fail to make a prima facie
case of undue influence. The definition of which, as given
by the present chief justice, in Phillips' Est., 244 Pa. 35,
43, with numerous authorities cited in support thereof,
follows: 'In order to constitute undue influence sufficient to
void a will, there must be imprisonment of the body or
mind, . . . fraud, or threats, or misrepresentations, or circumvention, or inordinate flattery, or physical or moral
coercion, to such a degree as to prejudice the mind of the
testator, to destroy his free agency and to operate as a
present restraint upon him in the making of the will'."
Volition
In the quotation from Hall v. Hall, supra, Sir J. P.
Wilde, described undue influence in a fitting phrase "to
overpower the volition without convincing the judgment."
This is probably the neatest phrase found in the great
amount of learning on this subject, it being recognized
that a general rule is difficult ot application and that what
constitutes undue influence is a question which must depend very much on the circumstances of each case. Volition is defined in the Cent. Dic. as "the act of willing; the
exercise of the will," and also quotes from Locke, Human
Understanding, this statement: "The actual exercise of
that power (the will) by directing any particular action or
its forbearance is volition."

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
The rule of law is, therefore, that the testator must be
in a state of free agency, so when the judgment is exer-

cised the act of willing is untrampled. Influences, affecting
the free exercise of human action may be good or bad but
all influences morally bad are not undue or unlawful in
the eyes of the law. Conversely, some morally good influences may be exercised to such an extent as to be
characterized as undue from a legal standpoint.
Marital Influences
The relationship of husband and wife naturally gives
rise to influences affecting their conduct one to another as
was aptly stated by Woodward, J. in Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 23 Pa. 375:
"If a wife by her virtues has gained such an ascendancy over her husband, that her pleasure is the law of his
conduct, such influence is no reason for impeaching a will
made in her favor, even to the exclusion of the residue of
her family; though if that influence was specially exerted
to procure the will in question, it might be sufficient to impeach it: Small v. Small, 4 Greenleaf 220."
On the other hand, the same influences may impel a
wife to make a will in favor of her husband and to the exclusion of their children. In Spence's Estate, 258 Pa. 542,
Walling, J. observed:
"The evidence establishes no circumstances indicating
that the will was procured by fraud or undue influence.
There is nothing to indicate that Mr. Spence had or exercised any influence over his wife, except that he was her
husband; and, being a near relative, the fact that he wrote
the will in which he was sole beneficiary does not cast
upon him the burden of proof as it would in case of a
stranger: Blume v. H'artman, 115 Pa. 32. Mrs. Spence is
presumed to know the contents of the paper signed by her:
Vernon v. Kirk, 30 Pa. 218; Dickinson v. Dickinson, 61 Pa.
401; Frew v. Clark, 80 Pa. 170."
Needless to remark in cases of marital influence the
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presumption is on the side of the proponent and the burden
upon the contestants to show some facts that would indicate the exertion upon the part of proponent of some
species of influence which the Courts have characterized
as undue. See Schouler on Wills, 6th Ed. Sec. 278; also
Perret v. Perret, 184 Pa. 131. Schouler suggests in Sec. 279
that undue influence may be more readily predicated of a
husband over his wife than of a wife over her husband.
But quere.
Filial Influences
The attitude of the law towards those sustaining filial
relations and in respect to mutual will making is the same
as that already discussed relative to marital relationship.
One of the hardest fought and now leading case on this
topic is that of Robinson v. Robinson, 203 Pa. 400. The
charge was undue influence in an issue devisavit vel non
where a will made by a mother in favor of a son was attacked. It was held that the trial Court properly stated
the law in charging as follows:
"A son may importune his mother to make a will in his
favor. He has a perfect right to do it, and if the only
effect was to move her affections or sense of-duty or judgment, he has a perfect right to do it; but if these importunities were such as the testator had not the power to resist,
and yielded for the sake of peace and quiet, or escaping
from serious distress of mind, if they were carried to a degree by which the free play of testator's judgment, or discretion, or wishes were overcome, it is undue influence. He
can coax her, but he must not drive her, either by moral
coercion or physical force."
In the late case of Aggas v. Munnell, 302 Pa. 78, 152 A.
840, Walling, J. declared:
"The undue influence must be such as to control the
testator in the act of making the will. Tetlow's Estate,

supra; Keen's Estate, 299 Pa. 430, 149 A. 737; Wolfe's
Estate, 284 Pa. 169, 130 A. 501; Gongaware et al v. Done-
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hoo et al., 255 Pa. 502, 100 A. 264; Herster v. Herster, 122
Pa. 239, 256, 16 A. 342, 9 Am. St. Rep. 95. Furthermore,
the proof fails to show a confidential relation between proponent and her father. Mere relationship does not create
a presumption of confidential relation (Leedom et al. v.
Palmer et ux., 274 Pa. 22, 117 A. 410; Vogan, Executor, v.
Jordan, 92 Pa. Super. Ct. 519), nor does the fact that they
resided in the same home, nor that she used his pension
money, with his approval, for the support of the family,
nor because she nursed him and attended to his wants, and
there is practically nothing else. That she, a daughter was
preferred in the will,,raises no presumption against her
as it might in case of a stranger. Caldwell v. Anderson,
104 Pa. 199, 206. She would be within her rights in urging
him to make a will in her favor (Leisey's Estate, supra;
Koon's Estate, 293 Pa. 465, 143 A. 125; Masterson v.
Berndt, 207 Pa. 284, 56 A. 866; Trost v. Dingler, 118 Pa. 259,
12 A. 296, 4 Am, St. Rep. 593), although there is no proof
whatever that she in fact did so. Solicitations, however
importunate, will not constitute undue influence. Englert
v. Englert, 198 Pa. 326, 47 A. 940, 82 Am. St. Rep. 808."
For an early case of a son as beneficiary in the father's
will, see Miller v. Miller, 3 S. & R. 267, 8 Am. Dec. 651.
In Pensyl's Estate, 157 Pa. 465, an issue on the ground
of undue influence was properly refused, the evidence
showing that the testatrix excluded two of her sons from
any participation in her estate, on the ground that these
sons "had not treated her right" and it appearing that the
two sons thus excluded had instituted lunacy proceedings
against their mother and that these proceedings had failed.
In Hook's Estate, 207 Pa. 203, it was held, inter alia,
as follows:
"To set aside a will on the ground of undue influence
where the testator is in full possession of his faculties and
his testamentary capacity admitted or established, the evidence must beclear and strong. Mere opinions or suspicions, or belief not founded on facts testified to, will not be
sufficient.
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The mere fact that the proponents of a will were the
favored children of the testatrix, and that they were more
attentive to her idl her declining years, is not sufficient to
establish undue influence in the absence of proof of acts or
course of conduct which unduly influenced the testamentary act.
The fact that a son tried unsuccessfully for years to induce his mother to exclude from her household a daughter,
is not evidence in favor of, but rather against undue influence; nor is the fact that at the time testatrix executed her
will she executed and delivered in escrow a deed to be delivered to a favorite son after her death on payment by
him to her estate of an amount alleged to be less than the
value of the land, irr itself evidence of undue influence.
The fact that a favorite son of testatrix largely benefited by her will, attended to her business and acted as her
attorney in her lifetime, does not in the absence of evidence
of impairment of testatrix's mental faculties, impose upon
him the burden of proving that he exercised no undue influence on the mind of his mother."
Conversely, it has been held on the trial of an issue devisavit vel non in which the alleged will is attacked on the
ground of undue influence that the case is for the jury
where the evidence on behalf of the contestant, although
contradicted tends to show that his mother, after a quarrel
with the contestant, declared that she would have the father cut him off without a cent and it being further shown
that she possessed great influence over her husband who
feared to resist her and that she immediately sent for a
lawyer and had the will in questiord prepared disinheriting
the contestant and that she told her husband who was ill
and weak at the timej and died of senility, five days thereafter, that if he did not sign the will she would put him out
of the house, and that she remained with her husband until
the will was executed.
Furthermore, it was shown that the testator and his
son had always been on good terms and that he had expressed his intention to divide the property equally between
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the son who had been very kind to him and his daughter.
At the trial evidence of declarations of the mother made a
few hours before the will, which made her the principal
beneficiary and disinherited the son, was drawn and executed to the effect that she would have her husband cut
off the contestant, his only son, without a cent, were held
admissible and Green, J. in passing upon this point said:
"As to the twelfth assignment, in relation to the declarations and acts of Sarah Perret as to what she would do,
and what she did actually do, in procuring the will to be
madd as it is, it would be strange indeed if these should be
excluded. She was the very person who was charged with
having exercised the undue influence, and her declarations
were of her own purpose to do that very thing, to have
Henry cut off without a cent, by means of a will which she
would procure her husband to make. And this was followed
up by actual and undisputed proof that that very thing
was done, and at the very time she said she would have it
done, to wit: the same night. And now we have before
us that very will, actually made on that same night, and
actually cutting Henry off from every possibility of getting
a single penny of the estate, and, yet we are asked to exclude evidence of her acts and declarations in producing
that result. Most certainly we will do no such thing. The
ingenuity displayed in accomplishing her object is someit than
thing remarkable. If the will had nothing more in,
she
had
then
and
wife,
a gift of the whole estate to the
died before her husband, intestate, Henry would have received one half the estate as heir of his mother. But even
that possibility was excluded by the next provision in the
will, giving the whole estate to the daughter in case the
wife died before her husband. The evil purpose, the positive malignity of the woman, could not be more strongly
indicated than by this provision; and that too against her
only son, who had contributed by his daily and unrequited
toil for twenty-five years to the support and maintenance
of both his parents. It is doubtful if so gross a case of
unnatural malevolence of a mother to a son can be found
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in the books. The principles and authorities cited in support of the twelfth assignment have nothing to do with
this subject, and they are altogether inapplicable.
The
assignment is dismissed."
Perret v. Perret, 184 Pa. 131.

Social Influences
In discussing testamentary power it was observed
from the citations that, generally speaking, a person has a
right to dispose of his property as he deems best providing
he possesses testamentary capacity and that although a
will may appear to be unjust yet this fact of itself is no evidence of lack of testamentary capacity. Morgan's Estate,
219 Pa. 355, 68 A. 953; Cauffman v. Long, 82 Pa. 72.
By the same token the fact that the provisions of a will
may appear to some to be unjust is no evidence of undue
influence. 7 Ann, Cas. 894, 13 Ann. Cas. 1044.
The influences motivating a testamentary disposition
may arise from a variety of social phenomena such as kind
treatment, and friendly services or a beneficiary may be
named by a testator not for love for the beneficiary but on
account of hatred, aversion and prejudice against some one
else. These are not commendable motives but on the other
hand are not necessarily unlawful.
In the English case, Wingrove v. Wingrove, 11 P. D.
81, Sir James Hannen in addressing the jury, inter alia,
said:
"A man may be the companion of another, and may encourage him in evil courses, and so obtain what is called an
undue influence over him, and the consequence may be a
will made in his favor. But that again, shocking as it is,
perhaps even worse than the other, will not amount to
undue influence.
"To be undue influence in the eye of the law there must
be-to sum it up in a word--coercion. It must be a case
in which a person has been induced by means such as I
have suggested to you to come to a conclusion that he or
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she will make a will in a particular person's favor, because
if the testator has only been persuaded or induced by considerations which you may condemn, really and truly to intend to give his property to another, though you may disapprove of the act, yet it is strictly legitimate, in the sense
of its being legal. It is only when the will of the person
who becomes a testator is coerced into doing that which he
or she does not desire to do, that it is undue influence."
In Roberts v. Clemens, 202 Pa. 198, binding instructions for the proponent of a will were approved by the
Supreme Court where the issue was undue influence. The
essential facts and the attitude of the Court are reflected
in the following from a Per Curiam opinion:
"The testatrix was a widow and had no children. Her
nearest collateral relatives were Jacob R. Clemens, this defendant, and two children of a deceased brother. The wife
of plaintiff, Mary E. Roberts, was her first cousin. The
testatrix had lived in her cousin's family for some two or
three weeks before her death; eight days before that event,
while ill in bed, she requested Mrs. Roberts to draw her
will, which she proceeded to do, and wrote the one in question. It was afterwards formally witnessed. It disposed
of all her property; the will itself shows she possessed a
full and detailed knowledge ok all her possessions; besides
Dr. Roberts and his wife, she names as legatees of specific
articles, no less than eight relatives. The will itself, with
the oral testimony, completely rebuts the allegation of
testamentary incapacity. It is argued, that the fact of her
large gift to the husband of her cousin, to the prejudice of
her living brother and the children of a deceased one, was
unnatural, and of itself suggestive of undue influence; this
is a mistake; Dr. Roberts and his wife at the time of her
husband's death and down to her own last illness, had, on
the undisputed testimony, been particularly kind and attentive to her; the husband daily ministered to her as a
physician, the wife as a nurse; her last illness was in Dr.
Robert's house and she died there; what more natural,
than that she should try to reward them by the gift of the

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
larger part of her small estate, not worth over $2,000.00?"
In Morgan's Estate, 219 Pa. 355, Mitchell, C. J. said:
"Testator had an only child, a daughter, whom he passed over and gave the bulk of his estate to her two children,
and it is argued from this that the will is an unnatural one
and evidence of undue influence. But a will is unnatural in
a legal sense only when it is contrary to what the testator
from his known views, feelings and intentions would have
been expected to make. When it is in accordance with such
views it is never unnatural, however much it may differ
from the ordinary actions of men in similar circumstances.
In the present case it was shown that the testator had a
prejudice against his son-in-law and that his reason for
passing over his daughter was to avoid the probability of
the estate coming into the hands or management of her
husband. It is conceded that the prejudice was without
any just foundation, but just or unjust its existence explains the testator's action and deprives it of all weight as
evidence of mental incompetency. As said by Paxton, J., in
Cauffman v. Long, 82 Pa. 72, quoted by the learned judge
below, "a man's prejudices are a part of his liberty." The
favoring of grandchildren in preference to children is not
in itself so unusual as to need justification."
In 7 Ann. Cas. 895, there is reference to certain New
York cases which hold that where a will is contrary to the
dictates of natural affection, of justice and of duty, the
burden is on the proponents to give some reasonable explanation of its unnatural character or at least that it was
not the result of mental defect, obliquity or perversion. It
is not conceived that our cases go to this length although it
is true that where a stranger has actively participated in
the preparation and execution of, a will in which he is the
beneficiary the burden of proof is placed upon him to show
that it was not the result of undue influence: Blume v.
Hartman, 115'Pa. 32; Hook's Estate, 207 Pa. 203; Spence's
Estate, 258 Pa. 542; White's Estate, 262 Pa. 356; L. R. A.
1918 D 755 Note and 774 Note.
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In Caldwell v. Anderson, 104 Pa. 199, Gordon, J., laid
down the rule in these words:
"The law as contained in those cases may be summarized as follows: Where the testator is shown to be of
weak mind, without regard to the cause or causes from
which that weakness hag arisen, though it be not sufficient
in itself to wholly destroy testamentary capacity, and the
person by whom, or under whose advice, the will has been
written, being a stranger to the testator's blood, receives
a legacy or bequest, large as compared to the testator's
estate, the burden of proof shifts from the contestants to
the proponent of the will. In such case not only must
testamentary capacity be affirmatively proved, but it must
also be shown that the testator acted with a full knowledge
of the value of his estate."
In Lawrence's Estate, 286 Pa. 58, Kephart, J. remarked:
"There is no presumption of mental weakness arising
from the fact that the will of the testator may seem to be
unreasonable or unnatural in its provisions, or that it
makes an unequal distribution among the next of kin, or
gives the property to a person other than the natural redipient of the testator's bounty (40 Cyc. 1019), except
where the disposition is so gross or ridiculous as to give
rise to a presumption of insanity. Unreasonable or unnatural disposition, with other evidence, may be used to
prove incapacity, but, standing alone, it is insufficient. Such
distribution may, however, become of the utmost importance when considering the question of undue influence to
which it is more closely related. Whatever may be thought
of the wisdom of the maker of the will, or of the just claims
of his collateral relatives upon his bounty, the internal circumstances of this will add little force to the bare allegation that he did not have disposing mind at the date of its
execution."
The relevant matter and cognate authorities were
further summed up in a recent case by Walling, J.:
"It may also be added that it is only where the testator
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is of weak mind, arising from physical or mental ailment
that a presumption of undue influence arises when a
stranger to his blood procures a large legacy: Adams's Est.,
220 Pa. 351; Caughey v. Bridenbaugh, 208 Pa. 414; Robinson v. Robinson, 203 Pa. 400; Friend's Est., 198 Pa. 363, 366;
Herster v, Hester, 122 Pa. 239; Caldwell v. Anderson, 104
Pa. 199, 204. To place the burden of proof on proponent,
there must be evidence of weakened intellect; Phillips'
Est., 244 Pa. 35, 44; Gongaware et al. v. Donehoo, et al.,
255 Pa. 502, 508. In the instant case, the physical weakness apparently had no effect upon his mental faculties. As
late as July 21, 1926, the decedent overruled Swartley as to
the manner of payment of a large farm bill. We might well
adopt here the language of Chief Justice Fell, speaking
for the Court, in Eble v. Fidelity T. & Tr. Co. et al., 238
Pa. 585, 589; "Undue influence to affect a will must be such
as subjugates the mind of the testator to the will of the
person operating upon it: Tawney v. Long, 76 Pa. 106.
Where the charge is that undue influence has been exerted
on a strong and free mind, nothing short of direct, clear
and*convincing proof of fraud or coercion will avail: Logan's Est., 195 Pa. 282. The only reasonable conclusion from
all the testimony is that the will in question was the deliberate act, after mature reflection, of a mind wholly unconstrained." Or, as stated by Mr. Justice Dean, speaking
for the court in McEnroe v. McEnroe, 201 Pa. 477, 482;
"Here, one of the most significant facts tending to show
undue influence is wholly absent; there was no impairment of the mental powers, no clouding of intelligence."
And see Miller's Est., 265 Pa. 315, 319: Phillips' Est., supra;
Yorke's Est., 185 Pa. 61, 70; Cuthbertson's App., 97 Pa. 163,
171."
Llewellyn's Estate, 296 Pa. 74.
Meretricious Influences
In Wingrove v. Wingrove, supra, Sir James Hannen
said:
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"We are all familiar with the use of the word "influence"; we say that one person has an unbounded influence
over another, and we speak of evil influences and good influences; but it is not because one person has unbounded influence over another that therefore when exercised, even
though it may be very bad indeed, it i9undue influence in
the legal sense of the word. To give you some illustrations oi what I mean, a young man may be caught in the
toils of a harlot, who makes use of her influence to induce
him to make a will in her favor, to the exclusion of his
relatives. It is unfortunately quite natural that a man so
entangled should yield to that influence and confer large
bounties on the person with whom he has been brought into
such relation; yet the law does not attempt to guard
against those contingencies."
In short, the rule of law is that the evidence of meretricious relations between testator and beneficiary does not
of itself raise a presumption of undue influence.
However, in Dean v. Negley, 41 Pa. 312, Lowrie, C. J.
opined:
"If the law always suspects, and inexorably condemns
undue influence, and presumes it from the nature of the
transaction, in the legitimate relations of attorney, guardian, and trustee, where such persons seem to go beyond
their legitimate functions, and work for their own advantage, how much more ought it to deal sternly with unlawful
relations, where they are, in their nature, relations of influence over the kind of act that is under investigation."
These remarks are thus explained by Mercur, J. in
Main v. Ryder, 84 Pa. 217:
"The fact that the testator lived with a woman to
whom he was not legally married, and that she and their
illegitimate offspring were the devisees of much of his
property, are urged as creating a presumption in law that
the will was executed under improper influences. The
case of Dean et al. v. Negley et al. is cited to support this
view. The opinion of the judge in that case expressly declares that the court does not decide such relations create a
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presumption of law of undue influence; but leaves the effect
thereof as a question of fact for the jury. To the same
effect is the case of Rudy v. Ulrich et al. 19 P. F. Smith 177.
No clearly defined weight can be given to such testimony.
Much must depend on the particular circumstances of each
case. It is an element undoubtedly to be considered."
In Wainwright's Appeal, 89 Pa. 220, Sharswood, C. J.
comments:
"In an issue devisavit vel non on the allegation of undue
influence by the mother of an illegitimate child, the legatee
in the will, the unlawful cohabitation of the mother with
the testator is not of itself sufficient evidence from which a
jury could infer undue influence: Rudy v. Ulrich, 19 P. F.
Smith 177. It is true that if there are other facts, unlawful cohabitation may be a circumstance of weight: Dean
v. Negley, 5 Wright 317; Main v. Ryder, 3 Norris 217. In
the case before us there was not a scintilla of evidence of
the exertion of any influence over the mind of the testator
in the testimentary act."
Compare Reichenbach v. Ruddach, 127 Pa. 564; Snyder v. Erwin, 229 Pa. 644.
In Wertheimer's Estate, 286 Pa. 155, Kephart, J.
stated:
"The second ground of complaint is undue influence
predicated on a charge of illicit relation between testatrix
and her husband prior to their marriage in 1912. It may
be doubted whether the rule in Dean v. Negley, 41 Pa. 312;
Reichenbach v. Ruddach, 127 Pa. 564 and Snyder v. Erwin,
229 Pa. 644, "that, where meretricious relation has been
shown to have existed between the testator and the principal beneficiary under his will and the will diverts the entire estate from the natural objects of the testator's bounty
and gives it over to a woman he has just married and with
whom adulterous commerce has been carried on, the presumption arises that the will was procured by undue influence," is still the law: Ewart's Est., 246 Pa. 579, 585,
586; Kustus v. Hager, 269 Pa. 103, 110, 111, where it appears the rule has been considerably modified if not en-
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tirely departed from. Such a presumption cannot arise or
continue where the marriage relation has existed for a long
time, here more than ten years. There may be circumstances where such presumption would be efficacious but
these do not exist in the present case. There is not sufficient evidence to find the fact of illicit relationship."
The present attitude is further endorsed by the same
Justice in writing the Opinion of the Court in Weber v.
Kline, 293 Pa. 85, wherein he reiterates:
"In Wertheimer's Est., supra, (at P. 164), we said that
it may be doubted whether "the rule in Dean v. Negley, 41
Pa, 312; Reichenbach v. Ruddach, 127 Pa. 564 and Snyder
v. Erwin, 229 Pa. 644, "that, where meretricious relation
has been shown to have existed between the testator and
the principal beneficiary under his will and the will diverts
the entire estate from the natural objects of the testator's
bounty and gives it over to a woman he has just married
and with whom adulterous commerce has been carried on,
the presumption arises that the will was procured by undue influence, is still the law: Ewart's Est., 246 Pa. 579,
585, 586; Kustus v. Hager, 269 Pa. 103, 110, 111, where it
appears the rule has been considerably modified if not entirely departed from." The existence of a meretricous relation standing alone will not give rise to presumption of
undue influence: Wertheimer's Est., supra."
In accord, Rood on Wills, Second Edition, Section 182.
Confidential Influences
The leading authority on this topic is the well considered and voluminous case of Yardley v. Cuthbertson, 108
Pa. 395-466, wherein Green, J. said, inter alia:
"The weight of the argument for the plaintiffs in error
is that the court charged in the qualification that although
the facts supposed by the point created no presumption
against the validity of the codicil yet "Mr. Yardley must
show by clear and satisfactory proof that the testator fully
understood the testamentary disposition of his property,
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because it is ground for suspicion when Mr. Yardley prepared the codicil for Mr. Neill which gave him a considerable interest and directed its execution." Why a suspicion
if under such circumstances there was no presumption
against the validity of the codicil? Why must Mr. Yardley
prove by clear and satisfactory evidence that this entirely
sound-minded man who 'suggested and directed the alterations' which gave Mr. Yardley "the considerable interest"
really understood the testamentary disposition he suggested or directed, if there was no presumption against the
validity of the codicil made under such circumstances? The
very foundation of the qualification thus made is the
thought that the presumption is that the codicil is the will
of Mr. Yardley and not the will of Mr. Neill and he must,
therefore, by clear proof overcome this presumption and
show that Mr. Neill understood the whole thing and meant
to give Mr. Yardley the considerable interest. Why must
Mr. Yardley show all this? (Because the law under the
circumstances stated presumes that Mr. Yardley as the
confidential agent of Mr. Neill controlled his mind. The
law presumes the codicil invalid until Mr. Yardley by due
proof rebuts this presumption) ....... If we turn to the
authorities it will be apparent that the court below did not
transcend them in using the language we are now considering. Thus in Redfield on Wills, 515, the writer says:
"Where the party to be benefited by the will has a controlling agency in procuring its formal execution, it is universally regarded as a very suspicious circumstance, and one
requiring the fullest explanation. Thus where a will was
written by an attorney or solicitor who is to be benefited
by its provisions it was considered that this circumstance
should excite stricter security and required clearer proof of
capacity, and the free exercise of voluntary choice." The
whole of this language was embodied and adopted in the
opinion of this court in the case of Boyd v. Boyd, 16 P. F.
S., 283."
In Arlington's Estate, 147 Pa. 624, Green, J., again took
up this topic and gave a review of the authorities pointing
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out that the rule of confidential relationship and the duties
imposed therein covered a wide field.
"We have no hesitancy in agreeing with the auditor
and court below in holding that a confidential relation
arose between the uncle and nephew after the letter of
attorney was executed, and the duty it imposed was undertaken by the attorney. He became then and thereby
charged with the special trust and confidence of protecting
the property of his prinipal, and of managing it, so as to
promote the best interests of his principal. Whatever was
done by him in hostility to that duty was a breach of the
trust and confidence reposed in him. The confidential relation is not at all confined to any specific association of
the parties to it. While its more frequent illustrations are
between persons who are related as trustee and cestui que
trust, guardian and ward, attorney and client, parent and
child, husband and wife, it embraces partners and copartners, principal and agent, master and servant, physician and
patient, and generally, all persons who are associated by
any relation of trust and confidence. When the relation
exists the consequent duties and obligations are perfectly
well established by long settled law."
Rood on Wills, Second Edition, Section 191, thus
states the rule concerning confidential relations:
"The rule as stated by Baron Parke and often approved, is this: "If a person, whether an. attorney or not,
prepares a will with a legacy to himself, it is at most a
suspicious circumstance, of more or less weight according
to the facts of each case, in some of no weight at all.....
varying according to the circumstances-for instance, the
quantum of the legacy, the proportion it bears to the
property disposed of, and numerous other circumstances."
In a few cases the mere fact that the beneficiary stood in a
confidential relation to the testator, as his attorney, physician, priest, guardian, or confidential agent, is held to raise
a presumption that this confidence was abused to obtain
the legacy, which will therefore be held void unless the proponent shows that no unfair advantage was taken of the
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testator. But the general rule is that the existence of confidential relations raises no presumption of undue influence
if the beneficiary is shown not to have had anything' to do
with the execution of the will."
In Miller's Estate, 265 Pa. 315, the testator gave a large
portion of his estate to his physician in trust for a young
woman who had lived with the testator from early childhood until her marriage and providing, inter alia, that the
residue of the trust after the deatlf of the beneficiary might
be disposed of by the physician as he saw fit. The will
excluded with an insignificant bequest the brother and
sister of the testator. It was contended that an issue d.
v. n. must be awarded because the confidential relation existing between the decedent and his physician raised a presumption of undue influence and ipso facto entitled the
contestant to an issue. Kephart, J. in the course of his
opinion stated that the interest which the testator's physician received under the will was sufficient to shift the
burden of proof to the proponents of the will to show testamentary capacity and that no improper influence was exerted. There was not a particle of proof to show at the
time testator met the physician and directed how the will
was to be written that he was not possessed of his full
mental faculties. The learned Justice in affirming the decree of the Orphans Court refusing to award an issue, observed:
"The mere denial of the physician isnot enough. But
the entire atmosphere of this case is devoid of any attempt
on the part of the physician to exercise control, other than
in a professional way, over the decedent. There was not
the slightest attempt to show the doctor did anything outside of the ordinary work of a physician promptly attended
to; nor was there evidence that those in attendance attempted to influence the testator's mind. It does appear
that he was determined to give his property to,those who
had shown some attention and affection for him during
the later period of his life."
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In XXXI Dickinson Law Review 128, Professor Joseph
P. McKeehan, writing on the subject "Undue Influence and
Wills in Pennsylvania" makes this observation concerning
Miller's Estate, supra:
"The burden of proof was cast upon this physician, not
so much because of the weakness of the testator but because of the rule that, "where a will is drawn in favor of
one occupying a confidential relation, who either writes
it, or procures it to be written, or whose advice is sought
and taken, the burden rests on such beneficiary to disprove
undue influence. Especially is this so, where the testator,
though possessing testamentary capacity, is of weak mind:
Boyd v. Boyd, 66 Pa. 283; Cuthbertson's App., 97 Pa. 163;
Armor's Estate, 154 Pa. 517; Wilson v. Mitchell, 101 Pa.
495; Douglass's Estate, 162 Pa. 567; Walton's Estate, 194
Pa. 528, 533."
The rule of law, therefore, deduced from our cases is
that where one occupying a confidential relation either
writes, or procures to be written a will 6f his principal in
which the confidant is a beneficiary, the burden rests on the
confidant to disprove the exertion of undue influence, irrespective of the mental or physical condition of the testator at the time of the will making. This burden, however,
may be under certain facts very light and the explanatory
proof submitted by proponent considered by the Court as
sufficient and not warranting the granting of an issue. On
this latter point Moschzisker, J. in Phillips' Estate, 244 Pa.
35 pertinently remarked:
"In, so far as the testimony of the proponent of a will
is not inherently unreasonable or improbable, the judge
may consider it in measuring the preponderance of the
evidence (Caughey v. Bridenbaugh, supra, 420, 424, 433;
Yardley v. Cuthbertson, 108 Pa. 395, 460; Wilson v. Mitchell, 101 Pa. 495, 505; Yorke's Est., 185 Pa. 61, 71), and in
the absence of "direct proof of undue influence actually exercised by the proponent" or "a presumption thereof arising against him from something in the evidence indicating
weakness or infirmity in the testatrix," his testimony, when
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taken with the other proofs in the case, may so far discharge the burden of explaining away any circumstances
introduced by the contestants' witnesses, which apparently
require explanation, as to justify binding instructions in
favor of, the will or the refusal of an issue. (Caughey v.
Bridenbaugh, supra, 433)."
See Caughey v. Bridenbaugh, 208 Pa. 414.
If the will was not written or procured to be written
by the confidential advisor who benefits, nevertheless, the
presumption of undue influence arises if the physical or
mental condition of the testator is shown at the time of the
will making to have been perceptibly weakened. In Lawrence's Estate, 286 Pa. 58, Kephart, J. thus states the rule:
"There is no presumption in this case that would shift
the burden to proponent on the question of undue influence. The rule is that "where the testator leaves a substantial part of his estate to one occupying a confidential
relation, the burden is on the latter to show that no improper influence controlled the making of the will ......
This presumption arises only when there has been proof
of extreme infirmity or mental weakness." Gongaware v.
Donehoo, 255 Pa. 502, 508; Phillips' Estate, supra, 444 46."
The strict rule against a confidential agent is not applied in cases of blood relationship unless the element of
the weakened physicial and mental condition of the testator is injected even though the will be written by the
confidant who is by its terms a principal beneficiary. In
Blume v. Martman, 115 Pa. 32, Green, J. said:
"Beyond question, if the will had been written by a
stranger who was by its terms the principal beneficiary,
the burden of proving that the testatrix was acquainted
with its contents, and had an intelligent consciousness of
the proportion of the estate to be taken by the beneficiary,
would rest upon him. But the Court below made a most
ample exception to this rule in favor of the plaintiff, because he was a son of the testratrix and therefore had a
right of importunity in his own favor without incurring
the penalty of affirmative proof."
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On the other hand in Miller's Estate, 179 Pa. 645, it was
held that where a testator, although possessed of testamentary capacity is aged, infirm bodily, with mental
faculties impaired, makes a will giving to his son, who is
also his confidential advisor, three fourths of his estate
there arises a presumption of fact that undue influence was
brought to bear on the mind of the testator and consequently the burden is on the son as beneficiary to rebut the
presumption.
Likewise, in Miller v. Miller, 187 Pa. 573, it was held
that in a contest over a will in which a son is largely preferred, if it appears that the son, athough not the father's
attorney, was his trusted and confidential agent, the burden
of proof is on the son to rebut the presumption of undue
influence. Although nothing is said in the latter case about
the testator's mental or physical condition, apparently the
rule of law as enunciated was based upon such facts.
That this is a fair assumption appears in the opinion of
the trial court in Friend's Estate, 198 Pa. 363, which opinion was approved per curiam, and wherein it appeared that
in a contest over a will in which a son was largely preferred, although it appeared that the son was his mothers
trusted confidential agent the burden of proof in the absence
of testimony tending to show that the mental faculties of
the testatrix were impaired, was placed upon the contestant to show that undue influence was used.
As indicated in the quotation, supra, from Darlington's
Estate, 147 Pa. 624, the confidential relation is not at all
confined to any specific association of the parties to it and
the term is of rather wide application. Even one acting as
a caretaker of an old and infirm testatrix was deemed to
come within the term.
Scattergood v. Kirk, 192 Pa. 263.
Hook's Estate, 207 Pa. 203.
In Leedom v. Palmer, 274 Pa. 22, Kephart, J. explained:
"No precise language can define the limits of the relation or fetter the power of the Court to control these conditions. While not confined to any specific association of
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parties, it generally exists between trustee and cestui que
trust, guardian and ward, attorney and client, and principal
and agent. In some cases the confidential relation is a
conclusion of law, in others it is a question of fact to be
established by the evidence: Hetrick's App., 58 Pa. 477,
479; Scattergood v. Kirk, 192 Pa. 263, 267. The mere existence of kinship does not, of itself, give rise to confidential relation such, as would impose the burden of proof on
the one receiving a gift to assert its validity. A child may
take a gift from a parent without being required to furnish explanatory testimony: Clark v. Clark, 174 Pa. 309, 336,
wherein the court quoted the English rule announced in
Baker v. Bradley, 7 De. G., M. & G. 597; Bigelow on Fraud,
368; Worrall's App., 110 Pa. 349, 364; Carney v. Carney,
196 Pa. 34, 38; Compton v. Hoffman, 265 Pa. 257, 263; Neureuter v. Scheller, 270 Pa. 80; Langdon v. Allen, 1 W. N. C.
395, 397; Heister v. Hiester, 228 Pa. 102, 107. Nor is there
confidential relation simply because the parties to the
transaction are brothers and sisters: Funston v. Twining,
202 Pa. 88, 90. Where a conveyance of property is to a
relative in consideration of support for life, in the absence
of fraud or undue influence it is favored as a family settlement. Under similar conditions, where the grantee was
the servant of the donor, and grantee's wife nursed the
donor in his last illness, the conveyance was not set aside
because of supposed confidential relations: Barnard v. Kell,
271 Pa. 80, 86."
Se also Aggas v. Munnell, 302 Pa. 78; 152 A. 840.
Presumptions
It has been noted, heretofore, that various presumptions are invoked in matters of testamentary capacity and
undue influence. Sometimes these presumptions are designated as of law or at other times of fact and still again of
mixed law and fact.
A presumption is an inference as to the existence of
one fact from the.existence of some other fact founded
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upon a previous experience of their connection or dictated
by the policy of the law. See Cent. Dic.
All of the presumptions discussed in the two issues
outlined are presumptions of fact and of course rebuttable.
For the convenience of the reader these presumptions
are collated as follows:
(1) The law presumes the competency of a testator
and that the instrument propounded expresses his free and
unconstrained wishes in regard to the disposition of his
property. Consequently, the will having been proved in
either form already discussed, the burden of coming forward with evidence and dislodging the prima facie case is
upon the contestants and they must show the contrary by
a preponderance of evidence.
Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 23 Pa. 375, Page 48 infra.
(2) The will having been proved in the forms already
discussed there is a presumption that the testator knew
the contents of the will as executed by him and the burden
is upon contestants to show the contrary.
Vernon v. Kirk, 30 Pa. 218, Page 52, infra.
(3) In cases of marital relationship, the will having
been proved in the forms already discussed the presumption arises in favor of testamentary capacity and the absence of undue influence.
Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 23 Pa. 375, Page 52, infra.
(4) In cases. of filial relationship the will having
been proved in the forms already discussed the presumption arises in favor of testamentary capacity and the absence of undue influence.
Hook's Estate, 207 Pa. 203, Page 54, infro.
(5) Where a stranger has actively participated in
preparation and execution of a will in which he is a substantial beneficiary the presumption arises of lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence and the burden of
dislodging the same is imposed upon the proponent.
Blume v. Hartman, 115 Pa. 32, Page 59, infra.
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(6) A meretricious relationship as shown of itself
raises no presumption of undue influence and consequently
the will having been proved in the forms already discussed
the presumption arises in favor of testamentary capacity
and the absence of undue influence.
Main v. Ryder, 84 Pa. 217, Page 62, infra.
(7) Where a confidential relationship is maintained
and the confidant has actively participated in the preparation and execution of a will in which he is a substantial
beneficiary the presumption arises of lack of testamentary
capacity and undue influence and the burden of dislodging
the same is imposed upon the proponent.
Yardley v. Cuthbertson, 108 Pa. 395, Page 64, infra.
(8) If the will was not written or procured to be
written by the confidential advisor who benefits, nevertheless, the presumption of lack of testamentary capacity and
undue influence arises if the physical or mental condition
of the testator is shown at the time of the will making to
have been perceptibly weakened.
Lawrence's Estate, 286 Pa. 58, Page 68, infra.
(9) It may be stated as a general proposition that in
any case where proof is submitted by contestants of a will
showing extreme infirmity or mental weakness upon the
part of the testator, a presumption arises of lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence which must be met
by the proponents.
Gongaware v. Donehoo, 255 Pa. 502.
Phillips' Estate, 244 Pa. 35.
Llewellyn's Estate, 296 Pa. 74.
For an interesting and valuable opinion on the subject
of burden of proof, presumptions and the granting of issues
in the matter of testamentary capacity and undue influence, see the remarks of Hanna, P.J., examining and explaining the Pennsylvania decisions, Yorke's Estate, 185 Pa. 61;
also a comprehensive note, 15 Ann. Cas. 551.
For a late case in -general accord with observations already made see Masho's Estate, 303 Pa. 56, 153 A. 899.
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Fraud
In the cases discussing the issue of undue influence
matters involving the fraudulent conduct of a beneficiary
may likewise appear and in many of the cases fraud is discussed as being synonymous with undue influence. However, in Boyd v. Boyd, 66 Pa. 283, Sharswood, J., very pertinently observes:
"Undue influence is very nearly allied to fraud, yet it
may be true that they are not identical, so that while undue influence comprehends fraud-fraud by no means embraces every species of undue influence: Redfield on Wills,
510, n. A person, for a very disinterested purpose, and
because he sincerely believes that it is the duty of a testatort to make a will of a particular character, may carry
his persuasion and influence beyond that point which is
legitimate. Yet it would hardly deserve so harsh a name
as fraud. But where the end and purpose of the influence
is the benefit of the party employing it, it is not easy to
distinguish and save it from the imputation."
Eckert v. Flowry, 43 Pa. 46.
Thompson v. Kyner, 65 Pa. 368.
Herster v. Herster, 12 Pa. 239, 28 A. L. R. 787, Note;
18 Ann. Cas, 412, Note.
Robinson v. Robinson, 203 Pa. 400.
There are very few cases in our reports where the
issues of fraud and undue influence are not necessarily
intertwined and as in Phillips' Estate, 244 Pa. 35, the definition of undue influence also embraces generally matters of
fraud going to the question of the testamentary act. The
citations already given under the discussion of undue influence cover most of the fraud cases.
In Dietrick v. Dietrick, 5 S. & R. 207, there was an
issue to try the validity of a will impeached on the ground
of imbecility in the testator and fraud and imposition practiced upon him by the principal devisee. It was also alleged that the testator was under the domination and control of this devisee who aroused the displeasure of the
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testator against a son whom he almost entirely disinherited by making false representations to the testator concerning the supposed extravagance of the son's wife. It was
also alleged that this devisee represented to the testator
that the son's wife was dissipated and of a loose character.
Gibson, J. held for the Court that evidence of the general
good character and conduct of the son's wife was admissible in evidence and in view of the Lower Court's action in
rejecting this evidence the judgment was reversed and a
new trial awarded.
In Nussear v. Arnold, 13 S. & R. 323, there was an
issue to try the validity of a writing purporting to be the
last will and testament of John Arnold. On the trial the defendant's witnesses proved that certain women had combined to impose on the testator, after he had lost the use of
his rational faculties; that they had kept him in a state of
intoxication and had represented each other as persons of
virtue and good character and urged him to make a will
in their favor, to the exclusion of his own blood relations,
the subscribing witnesses to the will made the same declarations. It was held that the defendant could properly
offer evidence that the persons in question were women of
bad character. Said Tilghman, C. J., "If the women were
really of good character they had a right to represent
themselves as such; but if being of bad character, they
made the testator believe they were good it was a circumstance of fraud very proper to be laid before the jury."
A unique case of constructive fraud perpetrated upon
the will maker is found in Stirk's Estate, 232 Pa. 98, involving exceptions to the adjudication of the account of the
personal representative of the decedent wherein the facts
and the holding of the Court, taken from the headnote
of the case, are as follows:
Where a woman executes her will by which she gives
her residuary estate, amounting to $340,000. to a charity,
and immediately thereafter executes a codicil in which
she states that as there may be a question of the legality of
the bequest to the charity if she dies within thirty days
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from the date of her will she revokes the gift to' the charity and gives her residuary estate to a trust company, such
gift to the trust company cannot be sustained, where it
appears that the trust company in question was a stranger
to testatrix, that she was not a stockholder therein nor a
depositor, that the will and codicil were prepared by an
assistant trust officer of the company, that the codicil was
prepared with the name of the residuary legatee left blank,
that when the scrivener asked the testatrix to whom she
wished her residuary estate to go in case of her death
within thirty days, she said "Give that to the company,"
naming the trust company, and that both the testatrix and
the scrivener must have intended, without openly stating
it, that the gift to the trust company was simply to meet
the requirements, of the law and carry the bequest to the
charities designated in the will.
In such a case the action of the scrivener constituted a constructive fraud which would prevent the trust company from reaping a benefit from it, although the company
did not in any way participate in the fraud.
No person can claim an interest Under a fraud committed by another. However innocent the party may be, if the
original transaction is tainted with fraud, that taint runs
through the derivative interest, and prevents any- party
claiming under it.
The rule of law of the preceding paragraph that no
person can claim an interest under a fraud committed by
another has been- approved in subsequent cases, notably,
Bickley's 'Estate, 270 Pa. at page 103; O'Connor v. O'Connor, 291 Pa. at page 186; Cameron v. Trust Company, 292
Pa. at page 121. See also 28 A. L. R. 1; 28 R. C. L. 139; 18
Ann. Cas. 412.
Assuming that the fraud was practiced by but one beneficiary under the will and that his interest could be segregated the question arises whether the interests under the
will could be separated so that the instrument would be
valid as to the innocent parties but invalid as to the guilty
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parties. This question does not appear to have been litigated in Pennsylvania but in Carson's Estate, 184 Cal. 437; 194
P. 5; 17 A. L. R. 239, it was said by Olney, J.:
"The present case is, then, one of fraud only. Being
such, there is another point of which we would speak before taking up the sufficiency of the evidence. It seems to
have been assumed that in case the contestants showed that
the will was induced-by the alleged fraud of Carson, the
entire will would fail. We do not so understand. There is
nothing either in the allegations of the contestants' petition or in their evidence, which would tend to show that
any of the other beneficiaries were parties to Carson's alleged fraud, or that his fraud had any effect upon the testatrix's testamentary intentions other than to induce her
to make him her residuary legatee and to appoint him as
her executor. So far as the other beneficiaries are concerned, their situation is that the testatrix died leaving behind her a duly executed instrument, expressing her testamentary wishes in their favor unaffected by undue influence, fraud, or other vitiating circumstance. This means
nothing more or less than that the will is perfectly valid
as to them. The result is that it is only the portions of the
will in favor of Carson whose probate should be revoked
in case the contestants should succeed, the remaining portions continuing as valid expression of the testatrix's testamentary intention. 1 Schouler on Wills, Executors, and
Administrators, Sec. 248; 14 Cyc. 1149; section 1272, Civ.
Code. If it were not possible to separate the portions affected by the fraud from those unaffected, it may be that
the whole will, would have to fail, but that question is not
presented here, for the provisions in favor of Carson are
easily and completely separable from the remainder. This
being the situation, it is apparent that the beneficiaries,
other than Carson, are not affected by the contest, however it may go, and are not interested parties to it."
See also Mechem and Atkinson Cases on Wills, page 47
and following.
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In 28 R. C. L. 139, it is stated that where only part of a
will has been the result of fraud such part will be vitiated
and held inoperative, citing Reggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506;
22 N. E. 188; 12 A. S. R. 819, 5 L. R. A. 340. There is also
a full note on the general subject of fraud in contests concerning wills in 28 A. L. R. 787 and these authorities may
be compared with 28 A. L. R. 1 and 18 Ann. Cas. 412 and
the general ruling already referred to in Pennsylvania and
exemplified by Stirk's Estate, supra.
Another phase of fraud either actual or constructive
in connection with wills is where a bequest or devise is given
upon an oral trust. In Hoffner's Estate, 161 Pa. 331, testatrix
made a gift with an oral trust attached that the donee
would leave a certain sum to a religious use and it was held
that although the gift by the donee by will would fail it
having been made within two days of death and contrary
tc the Act of April 26, 1855, P. L. 332, nevertheless in an
adjudication of the executor's account the charity could
recover the money according to the oral trust doctrine and
that to deny such recovery would be a species of fraud
against the wishes of the donor.
To the same effect is Estate of Lidstone, 9 Pa. Super.
Ct. 553 and in Hollis v. Hollis, 254 Pa. at page 94, the principle is thus set forth:
"A trust orally annexed by a testator to a bequest or
devise absolute in form, and accepted by the legatee or
devisee at the time when the provision was made (or by
his assent given prior to and continuing at that time) either
expressly or by words or acts of encouragement, or by
silent acquiescence, may be enforced in equity, because a
refusal to perform the trust under such circumstances is a
fraud. The doctrine and its limitations, firmly settled in
the jurisprudence of this State, are illustrated by a uniform line of decisions, as the principal ones among which
may be cited Hoge v. Hoge, 1 Watts 163; Jones v. McKee,
3 Pa. 496; Irwin v. Irwin, 34 Pa. 525; Church & Wife v.
Ruland & Wife, 64 Pa. 432; Schultz's" App., 80 Pa. 396;
Brooke's App,, 109 Pa. 188; Hodnett's Est., 154 Pa. 485;
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Hoffner's Est., 161 Pa. 331; McAuley's Est., 184 Pa. 124;
McCloskey v. McCloskey, 205 Pa. 491; Washington's Est.,
220 Pa. 204; Flood v. Ryan, 220 Pa. 450; Blick v. Cockins,
234 Pa. 261."
Another phase of fraud is found in the curious case. In
re Culbertson's Estate, 301 Pa. 438, wherein fraud was
practiced upon a Register of Wills in the matter of a probate of an alleged will executed by mark. The essential
facts together with the pertinent law appear in the following quotation from the opinion of Sadler, J.:
"It is urged that the letters testamentary, granted
more than twelve years prior to the institution of this proceeding, cannot be revoked, though it appears that the will
presented was a forgery and received because of fraud
practiced upon the register. The Acts of March 15, 1932,
Sec. 31, P. L. 135, April 22, 1856, Sec. 7, P. L. 532, and June
25, 1895, P. L. 305, are practically repealed, in so far as a
limitation is placed upon the time for taking an appeal by
the Register of Wills Act of 1917 ,supra, P. L. 422, Sec. 16
(a), 20 PS Sec. 1886, which makes the probate conclusive
as to all property, unless an appeal is taken within two
years, thus supplanting the first statute, which designated
five, and the second, three, as the time for asking a review.
In the present case, the record has been certified to the
Orphans' Court to correct an error resulting from the fraud
practiced upon the register in presenting to him a will,
executed with a mark, and attested by two parties purporting to be witnesses, one of whom was shown to have signed
the paper in question. The register had jurisdiction to probate only if two persons had witnessed the unsigned instrument, and the Court has found that no such subscription took place. As a result, there was no will, and no act of
the officer could make the paper presented such, if none at
any time existed. The invalidity of an entirely void writing was declared in Wall v. Wall, 123 Pa. 545, 16 A. 598, 10
Am. St. Rep. 549, where the letters granted were based on
an unexecuted but witnessed instrument, the register finding an intention of the deceased that the paper should be
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treated as a last testament. Though judgments usually
render matters res judicata, yet fraud in the securing of
one unwarranted, as appears here, may render it worthless.
Rubinsky v. Kosh, 296 Pa. 285, 145 A. 836; Mitchell v.
Kintzer, 5 Pa. 216, 47 Am. Dec. 408. To the same effect
will be found Jackson v. Summerville, 13 Pa. 359; Phelps v.
Benson, 161 Pa. 418, 29 A. 86. The present proceeding was
a direct attack on the grant of letters testamentary, and
not merely a collateral one, a distinction recognized in
Cochran v. Young, 104 Pa. 333, 338. The jurisdiction of
the register is limited to the determination as to whether
the paper presented has been legally executed as the will of
the deceased, and if his action has been induced by fraud,
the order following is void and may be set aside. See
McCambridge v. Walraven, 88 Md. 273 41 A. 928; Holton v.
Davis (C.C.A.) 108 F. 138; Wall v. Wall, supra. See also,
Smith v. Markland, 223 Pa. 605, 72 A. 1047, 132 Am. St.
Rep. 747.
Judgments in the ordinary course may be avoided by
proving extrinsic fraud, by which is meant some act or
conduct of the prevailing party which has prevented a fair
submission of the controversy. And, where this appears, an
original decree entered may be vacated. McFadden v.
McFadden, 91 Pa. Super. Ct. 301; Willetts v. Willetts, 96
Pa. Super. Ct. 198. Though the exact question here presented, attacking the probate of a will after the time fixed
by the statute for an appeal has passed, for fraud and imposition on the officer, has not been expressly determined
by this Court, yet final orders have been set aside, in other
classes of proceedings, where a time limit for review was
fixed by statute. Zeigler's Petition, 207 Pa. 131, 56 A. 419;
York County v. Thompson, 212 Pa. 561, 61 A. 1024; Lackawanna County's Appeals, 296 Pa. 271, 145 A. 843. The cases
cited dealt with proceedings in which accounts of officers
were assailed for fraud, after the period designated by act
of assembly for taking an appeal,"
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Proofs
In the citations and discussions already given relative
to the issues of testamentary capacity, undue influence,
fraud and other matters pertinent to the establishment of a
will, those of proof have been incidentally touched upon.
However, in the well considered case of Robinson v. Robinson, 203 Pa. at page 36, Dean, J. discusses a matter of importance in connection with the proofs and established in
Nussear v. Arnold, 13 S. & R. 323, and already discussed
under the heading of Fraud:
"Next it is alleged for error that the declarations of
John B. Robinson were permitted to go to the jury and
consequently affected other legatees who had nothing to do
with the preparation or execution of the will. Under this
head appellants' counsel group 226 assignments of error,
setting them out in the old form of a multiplication table.
The authorities cited sustain this point, but the point is
not framed tc fairly cover the ruling of the Court on the
admission of the offer. In Nussear v. Arnold, 13 S. & R.
323, Clark v. Morrison, 25 Pa. 453, and other cases, it is held
that the interest of devisees under a will are several and
not joint, therefore, that the declarations of one against his
codevisees are not admissible to affect their interests. But
it will be noticed in these cases, that the declarations consisted in an opinion of the legatee as to the testamentary
incapacity of the testator and for that purpose they were
offered. In the first case cited, there was evidence that
three women had combined to get the testator drunk and
procure from him a will in their favor; that they had declared to him they were persons of virtue and good
character. These declarations made in carrying out the
conspiracy were admitted, but the declaration of one of
them outside the scope of the conspiracy that "the testator
was incapable of transacting business," was held inadmissible. Chief Justice Tilghman, in deciding the case, says:
"We are now to establish a general principle to govern
all cases of this kind." That general principle was, that
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thei conduct and declarations of those procuring a will by
unlawful means, tending to show their purpose, are evidence; the independent declarations of one as to testamentary incapacity are not. Here, the offer was not to prove
declarations of incapacity, it was to prove a confidential
relation between the chief beneficiary and testatrix, collusion between him and her agents to procure her to make
a will; and by the course of business between them extending over years, the subserviency of a weak mind to stronger ones. The only independent declarations proven were
those of John B. Robinson on the witness stand, that his
mother was not weak but was entirely capable, and had
knowledge of her affairs; these statements formed no part
of contestant's offer and were not the subject of the court's
ruling. The Court, after most careful consideration, admitted the evidence of the business and confidential relations of the parties from long before, down to the date of
In this
the will, strictly confining it to the purpose offered.
there was no error. Says Justice Gibson in Patterson v. Patterson, 6 S. & R. 55, "In fact, the evidence of practice on the
intellect of a weak man, is usually compounded of ingredients so various in their nature and remote in their consequence and connection, that the question of relevancy is
often of very difficult solution. In such a case the Court
should lean in favor of admitting the evidence, to enable
the jury to judge from a consideration of all the circumstances." The case before us does not to us seem even
difficult of solution; if the evidence admitted were to be
held incompetent, we can scarcely conceive of any case,
short of actual physical duress, where undue influence could
be proven. All the assignments of error under this caption
are overruled."
The general attitude of our Appellate Courts and the
analysis to which proofs are subjected are very well illustrated in the remarks of Moschzisker, J. in Phillips'
Estate, 244 Pa. at page 45, wherein the learned justice thus
reviews the essential proofs:
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"After reviewing the testimony and calling attention
to the fact that there was no direct proof of solicitation, a
course of flattery or other elements necessary to constitute
undue influence, the court below states that the circumstances relied upon by the contestants do not in themselves
prove that fraud (undue influence), "that most of them, if
not all of them, are just as consistent with the hypothesis
that no fraud existed," and that, since no direct attack
had been made upon the truthfulness of the proponent or
of Miss Patterson, the only living witness to the will, and
since there was nothing "inherently unreasonable or improbable in her story or that of Charles Miller," considering all the proofs in the case, "if a jury would render a
verdict against the validity of Elizabeth Phillips' will on
the ground that when she executed it her act was not
voluntary and of her own free will . . . it would be the
duty of the Court to set such verdict aside." We have held
that the testimony of a disinterested person who was
"actually present at the drafting of a will, its, engrossing
and submission to the testator, heard his assent to its provisions, saw him affix his signature thereto, and listened
to his remarks and conversation," is entitled to "belief and
reliance (Tasker's Est., 205 Pa. 455, 459; Masterson v.
Berndt, 207 Pa. 284, 288), and we cannot say that the learned judge below erred in this instance when he considered
the evidence given by Miss Patterson; nor do we think
error was committed in taking cognizance of the testimony of the proponent. The adjudication plainly shows
that the Court did not rest its final conclusion on the testimony of these two witnesses, but rather upon what it
deemed to be the weight of the evidence, judged according to the applicable rulings of this Court, and thereunder
the failure of the contestants to prove their allegation of
undue influence. Of course, such influence may be shown
by circumstantial evidence demonstrating a prior course
of improper conduct calculated to produce an undue impression likely to remain and operate in the subsequent
making of a will (Steadman v. Steadman, 10 Sadler 539);
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but it is not enough simply to prove a course of conduct,
consistent with propriety, which afforded opportunities for
undue influence (Tyson's Est., 223 Pa. 596). The testimony
shows that Charles Miller was courteous to the testatrix
personally and diligent in his attention to her affairs for
several years prior to the making of the will, and that she
undoubtedly had a high regard for and absolute confidence
in him; further, it indicates generous appreciation of his
kindness and constant attentions and is sufficient to prove
a confidential business relation between them; hence, had
there been any proof of extreme infirmity or mental weakness, this case would have been one proper to send to the
jury. But, with the conceded fact of Elizabeth Phillips'
strong mentality at the time she made her will, and in
view of the lack of direct evidence of undue influence, we
cannot say that the court below erred when it refused
the issue."
For an outline of facts which when shown by the
principal beneficiary under a will meets the burden of
proving absence of undue influence, see Girard Trust Company v. Page, 282 Pa. 174.

Chambersburg, Pa.
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